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What role, if any, does Kierkegaard assign to reason in ethics? Making 
constant reference to a book that challenges Kierkegaard’s account of 
the ethical (Alastair MacIntyre’s After Virtue. *) the essay that follows is a 
reply to this question. Through some fault of his own, Kierkegaard has 
left MacIntyre and others with the impression that he did not believe 
the choice to live in ethical terms could be defended on rational 
grounds. Contra MacIntyre, I shall argue that Kierkegaard does in fact 
offer reasons for advancing from the first to the second stage on life’s 
way. However, having defended Kierkegaard from one charge of irra­
tionalism, I argue that when considered as a moral phenomenologist 
Kierkegaard did in fact underestimate the role of reason. Thus MacIn­
tyre is right to complain that Kierkegaard paid insufficient attention to 
the problem of adjudicating between conflicting moral claims.
1. A synopsis o f MacIntyre’s reading
MacIntyre hypothesizes that in the late 17th and early 18th centuries, 
morality emerged as a concept without a home, either in theology, law, 
or aesthetics (AV 39). Unhoused as he claims it was, the need for a justi­
fication of morality loomed up in the „enlightenment project“. This 
project first failed, and with all hope being abandoned in the coming of 
a messianic justification, the more decisive cultural event took place — 
the project was perceived as a failure. It is in the protracted here and now 
of this dispiriting perception that MacIntyre situates the present dark age, 
an age which envisages moral debate in terms of a confrontation between 
incompatible and incommensurable moral premises and moral commit­
ment as the expression of a criterionless choice between such premises, a 
type of choice for which no rational justification can be given (AV 39).
Kierkegaard plays a protagonist’s role in this, the first of MacIn­
tyre’s multi-volume philosophical drama, and with the purpose of illu­
minating both Kierkegaard’s and MacIntyre’s texts, I propose in what 
follows to examine a critical section of After Virtue. Please note, how­
ever, that in this section MacIntyre identifies Kierkegaard with one and 
only one text. For MacIntyre, Kierkegaard is Either/Or and Either/Or is 
Kierkegaard. Apart from one glancing reference, no other works are 
touched upon, let alone treated.
MacIntyre isolates three key features of Either/Or. For one, he 
notes that the book’s mode of presentation and content are mirror ima­
ges of one another (AV 39). As for the content, MacIntyre insists that 
through all the voices in Either/Or one message is bell-clear, there are no 
rational grounds for choosing between the ethical and the esthetic (AV 
40f.). There are no real arguments, only hurrahs and gestures of com­
mendation. And so, MacIntyre glosses, we find in this work the perfect 
coincidence of form and content. Once more, the thesis is that there are 
nothing but commendations, and commendations are all the reader gets. 
‘A’ commends the life of the esthete, ‘B’ (Judge Wilhelm) commends 
the life of duty, and the editor, Victor Eremita, arbitrarily arranges the 
recommendations o f ‘A’ and ‘B’.
Feature number two is this — for Kierkegaard, and not coinciden­
tally, for Kant, „the ethical is presented as that realm in which principles 
have authority over us independently of our attitudes, preferences and 
feelings“ (AV 41). But whence comes this absolute authority? For Mac­
Intyre? For MacIntyre’s Kierkegaard? And finally for Kierkegaard? To 
query number one MacIntyre replies:
„To answer this question (whence comes the authority of ethical 
principles) consider what kind of authority any principle has 
which it is open to choose to regard as authoritative“ (AV 42).
Be it a principle of practical reasoning or the eleventh commandment, 
said principle or commandment has as much authority as I can give rea­
sons for heeding it, so that „a principle for the choice of which no rea­
sons could be given would be a principle devoid of authority“ (AV 42). 
On MacIntyre’s reading, Kierkegaard offers no reasons for choosing the 
ethical over the esthetic and so he presents Kierkegaard as blundering — 
the ethical has absolute authority, the ethical has no authority (AV 42).
Finally, MacIntyre calls attention to what he takes to be the fact
that Either/Or is a highly conservative document, and he adds that the 
book’s hidebound quality is at odds with the novel form of moral self­
justification that Kierkegaard is depicted as peddling. True, it could be 
argued that the author of Either/Or was very soon to become, if he 
wasn’t already, a spiritual insurgent of the first order, but just the same, 
MacIntyre persists in claiming that the Kierkegaard of 1842 was trying 
to scribble in a „new practical underpinning for an older and inherited 
way of life“ (AV 43). MacIntyre continues, „it is perhaps this combina­
tion of novelty and tradition which accounts for the incoherence at the 
heart of Kierkegaard’s position“ (AV 43).
2. W ho is MacIntyre’s Kierkegaard?
Anyone who has browsed through, much less written an introduction or 
two on Kierkegaard knows well enough that if you must equate Kierke­
gaard with the author of Either/Or, do so with all trepidation, for more 
than any of his many pseudonymous works, Kierkegaard held this, his 
bestseller, at a distinct arm’s length. MacIntyre has been the full length 
of the corpus, and he has written a pair of critical summaries, but he still 
draws the equation with insufficient reluctance. To be sure, the reader is 
officially informed that one could argue what many scholars feel free to 
assume, namely, that if there is an ethical theory in Either/Or, Kierke­
gaard himself did not hold it. MacIntyre acknowledges that even if Kier­
kegaard did take the position After Virtue nails him to, it was not for 
long. Though he does not indicate how he thinks Kierkegaard’s ethics 
have changed, the author is careful to whisper that by 1845 and with the 
publication of Philosophical Fragments, Kierkegaard’s characterization of 
the ethical „has changed radically“ (AV 41). But note well, this radical 
change „had become already abundantly clear even in 1843 in Frygt og 
Bceven“ (AV 41)2; that is, less than a year after completing Either/OF. 
This much of a confession can be dragged out of After Virtue — if MacIn­
tyre’s Kierkegaard was Kierkegaard at all, it was only for a few of Kier­
kegaard’s earliest semesters.
If, as the narrative insists, the Kierkegaard of Either/Or is laboring 
to lay a foundation for morals, then it would be absurd to identify him 
with any of his esthetic alter egos. But more than trying to ground mor­
als, it is critical to this chapter of MacIntyre’s history that Kierkegaard be 
considered a regular bastion of conservatism. Kierkegaard is supposed to
be confused and incoherent, and the source of his muddled state is sup­
posed to be the implacable need to combine immiscibles — radical 
choice and conservative values (AV 43). In point of fact, MacIntyre 
hints at what he is about to do, namely, to fuse the figure of Kierkegaard 
with that of the conservative and orotund Judge Wilhelm (or ‘B’). Here 
are the fingerprints; while Kierkegaard is nowhere and everywhere in 
Either/Or, „perhaps we detect his presence most of all in the belief that 
he puts into the mouth of ‘B’...“ (AV 41). Perhaps nothing. So far as 
Ma.clntyre is concerned, Kierkegaard’s moral theory is the latent content 
behind the Judge’s manifest moralizing. For, if not the Judge, then who 
is the credulous curator of traditional values that MacIntyre has as his 
Kierkegaard of 1842? Note, however, that the Judge’s style, his spoony 
Christianity, to say nothing of his self-contradictions are signs enough 
that this frequently touching, but often boorish pate is hardly a man after 
Kierkegaard’s own heart4.
But are the ethics of Judge Wilhelm the ethics of the young 
Kierkegaard? Though I am by no means certain5, I move to accept 
MacIntyre’s donee, for who, after all, can argue with someone as close 
to Kierkegaard as Kierkegaard’s Johannes Climacus? And as Johannes 
tells it, the second part (of Either/Or) represents, „an ethical individuality 
existing on the basis of the ethical“6. The equation drawn and accepted, 
let us examine MacIntyre’s claim that in Either/Or Kierkegaard is not 
only representing the ethical but announcing the utter irrationality of it. 
According to this announcement, no one person can give another rea­
son for understanding his or her life in ethical terms. No, as MacIntyre 
reads it, the choice of moral striving and guilt is a criterionless choice. 
But does MacIntyre’s description fit?
3. The so-called criterionless-choice
Although he will disregard Kierkegaard’s self-explanations a page later, 
MacIntyre is right to report that, „Kierkegaard’s professed intention in 
designing the pseudonyms of Enten/Eller was to present the reader with 
an ultimate choice“, enten — the ethical, eller — the esthetic mode of liv­
ing and regarding life. Hypothesizing again, MacIntyre suggests, „sup­
pose that someone confronts the choice between them, as yet having 
embraced neither“ (AV 40). Well then, that someone is a self-deluded 
esthete. For Kierkegaard, there is no sitting on the fence between selves.
If you have not chosen, you are an esthete, but if you are really facing 
the choice, you have already chosen to choose.
There simply is no earnestly facing the choice qua an individual 
who has yet to choose, for to acknowledge the choice is to affirm that 
you have a self, which marks the second, not the first, stage on life’s 
way. And that in one breath is why Kierkegaard believed he only 
needed „to present the reader with an ultimate choice“ (AV 40).
MacIntyre obliquely discloses the impossibility of the Kierkegaar- 
dian self on the fence. He comments that for Kierkegaard and certainly 
Judge Wilhelm, there is no choosing the esthetic (AV 40-41)7. MacIn­
tyre writes as though he believed the infallibility of the first genuine 
choice follows from the passion with which it is made — and that is that. 
It isn’t. O f course, once the inwardness, which earmarks the ethical is 
present, the choice is made; and so, again, one cannot earnestly hover 
between life A and life B. But even apart from this, there is no choosing 
the esthetic, simply because there is no one to choose it. As our public 
servant defines it, „the esthetical in a person is that by which he is spon­
taneously and immediately what he is“ (,,det aesthetiske i et Menneske er 
det, hvorved han umiddelbar er det, han er“8). Be he or she a sensualist, 
sincere social activist, or knight of faith, everyone has, or is, their 
esthetic side, and Kierkegaard repeatedly warns, we had better remem­
ber it. Once more, the earnest choice of oblivion that MacIntyre re­
proaches Kierkegaard for overlooking would amount to an earnest 
choice not to choose. But the choice not to choose would be the very 
kind of serious choice that the purely esthetic precludes. Rightly or 
wrongly, the Kierkegaard that MacIntyre’s narrative takes to task has it 
that there is no leaping in and out of the lethe of immediacy. There is 
despair and defiance, but no dashing the brains out of self-con­
sciousness9. The individual who is either gullible or serious enough to 
come to the uncoerced conclusion that he must choose between one 
self-perspective and another, is, by Kierkegaard’s standards, a pretty 
serious fellow who has, in his very quandary, already acknowledged his 
ethical identity.
All unacceptable hypotheses aside, MacIntyre explains that the 
self, so situated between selves, could not be given reasons for the final 
imperative: I should choose the ethical, or for that matter, I should 
choose the esthetic (AV 40). Echoing After Virtue’s analysis, the esthetic 
is no choice at all and, so for the purposes of the reconstructed argument 
we may proceed — any chain of moral reasons that might be stretched
before an esthete presupposes his regarding those reasons as having 
force. Choose good and evil, the moralist imagines he is arguing, for by 
relating to yourself in those terms you will best, „serve the demands of 
duty, or to live in that way will be to accept moral perfection as a good 
and so give a certain kind of meaning to one’s actions“ (AV 40). But 
what does a Sybarite care about duty, moral perfection, or meaning? 
Nothing, answers MacIntyre in his synopsis; for Kierkegaard it is only 
by radical choice, that is, a choice for which no reasons can be adduced 
that we come into the ethical, and it is only by radical choice that the 
ethical comes into its foundations.
Judging both from his encyclopedia entry10 and After Virtue, Mac­
Intyre has been pressing long and hard to inoculate every student against 
what he takes to be the dangerous charms of Kierkegaard’s irrationalism. 
The already mentioned scourge term is the so-called „criterionless 
choice“ that MacIntyre’s Kierkegaard enjoins us to make. And what 
renders the choice of the ethical a criterionless choice? Once again, the 
fact that it is supposed to be a choice of first principles renders it a crite­
rionless choice. And if the proof is in the act of choice? It makes no dif­
ference. If a converted Don Juan cannot provide the next Don Juan 
with compelling reasons to follow his lead, his conversion is without a 
basis in reason. And what is to count as a compelling reason? As I un­
derstand MacIntyre, so long as the esthete has a choice that reason can­
not mindlessly make, say the choice whether or not to give force to ap­
peals to a meaningful life, he has no reason. But, to cover the same 
ground again, we always have a choice, which is not to say that we 
always have a coin to toss. There is, as the sequel to After Virtue con­
cedes11, something in between chance and demonstration; or more to 
my point, from the fact that one life view cannot be strictly deduced 
from a crumbling or absent other, it does not follow that the choice of 
the one, from within the context of the other, is necessarily arbitrary12. 
Besides, the Judge explains that and why it is in an individual’s enlight­
ened self-interest to choose the ethical.
Make no mistake about it, A and B are not from different planets. 
Whether or not it is to his ultimate discredit, if the Judge could step out 
of his pages, he would be quick to remind MacIntyre that there is more 
continuity (equilibrium) between the ethical and the esthetic than Mac­
Intyre encourages us to imagine. Even assuming that the Judge has made 
the turn he is prodding A to make, he has not left the esthetic behind13. 
He need not march back and forth to the Royal Library and lucubrate
for months on end in order to reconstruct the world as seen through the 
categories of hedonic interests. The Judge argues that A has every good 
reason, every rational motive, for choosing to live seriously as opposed 
to indifferently. There is only space and call for a sample of these briefs14, 
but each comes to this — an ethical existence is superior to and/or a cure 
for the ills endemic to estheticism.
No more an ethical theorist than an ethical rigorist, the Judge 
charges that there is no unity in a life that cannot sit still15. Since there is 
no unity in his life, A cannot provide a coherent account of himself16. 
And in the event A couldn’t care less about giving a coherent account of 
his life, B admonishes, „he who cannot reveal himself cannot love, and 
he who cannot love is the most unhappy man of all“ 17. Everyone wants 
to be happy, therefore one should choose the ethical, for it is only by 
that act of choice that a person can create the ballast that makes unity 
and happiness possible. In 1839 Kierkegaard remarked, „longing is the 
umbilical cord of the higher life“. The Judge more than agrees18, he fills 
in the content of what he takes these ubiquitous longings to be. There 
are, he assumes, universal desires for inter alia a life view, meaning, 
serenity, and as mentioned, happiness. In short, the allegedly debunking 
question of the esthete’s „giving force“ to the terms of the Judge’s ap­
peals does not arise. True, every desire will appear differently according 
to the categories through which it is conceived, but both the Judge and 
Kierkegaard suppose that there is enough continuity to reason the 
esthete out of one conception and toward another. And so B writes as 
though to grant „think of these ends as you may, there is more meaning, 
peace of mind, and happiness in a life devoted to duty than in one de­
voted to fleeing boredom“. And if beauty be your lodestar then take 
heed, there is more beauty to be garnered with an eye fixed upon the 
Good than with one trained for the interesting19.
Finally both character and creator assume that despair is every­
one’s negative Prime Mover. On solid evidence, if not confession, the 
Judge diagnoses his friend as a case of intense (and so for Kierkegaard, 
promising) despair. Though only possessing a balm, B offers the remedy 
that Kierkegaard’s anthropology has A groping for. What is twice as im­
portant, he argues, and with Kierkegaard’s blessings, that where the 
esthete has a goal — e.g., happiness, success — the conditions for satisfac­
tion are always beyond the ken of his control20. This, having one’s axis 
outside of oneself, emerges as the primary definiens for despair and from 
it B draws out the conclusion that a fleeting, unduty-bound existence is
necessarily a despairing one21. Despite the curtain of problems that Jo­
hannes de Silentio is poised to let drop, the Judge assures his distraught 
companion that nothing can come between an individual and his duty. 
So again, if only by reason of its being a cure, A should choose the ethi­
cal and by implication, he should choose to regard himself as the culprit 
responsible for his despair22.
Even Aristotle throws up his hands here and there, and not just at 
the individual who will not listen to the law of non-contradiction. 
There is, for instance, no reasoning with the underground man who re­
fuses to accept happiness as his final good. If the choice that Kierkegaard 
worked into his every work were an unloaded one between box A and 
box B, MacIntyre would have his point -  but it isn’t23. Explaining their 
inevitable failure to make compelling moral sense, MacIntyre remarks 
that Diderot, Smith, and alas, Kierkegaard, „all reject any teleological 
view of human nature, and of man as having an essence which defines 
his true end“. And this is „why their project of finding a basis for moral­
ity had to fail“ (AV 54). I cannot vouch for the other defendants, but 
the author behind the editor of Either/Or has his telos, and it is relative 
to it that choice finds its rational grounds. Whether or not Kierkegaard 
has the right telos remains another gaping question, but the telos is as­
sumed to be there, pushing from behind (despair) and pulling from 
above (longing). All children of miraculous faith aside, every natural 
person is naturally in despair, some much more intensely than others. 
Some much more intensely than others, every natural person naturally 
yearns to be free of the despair which Kierkegaard contends every 
natural person is himself spinning. Aristotle’s Ethics presupposes his 
psychology, and likewise Kierkegaard’s concept of choice presupposes a 
universal but not universally recognized need to be whole. Despair is 
sin, sin the universal sickness, and faith alone the cure, which can only 
begin to be secured by a choice that A has yet to make and other 
choices that B (the Judge) may need his C and D to awaken him to.
4. A critical note
Understandably, Kierkegaard scholars complain that Kierkegaard was 
simply not trying to do the kinds of things that MacIntyre chides him 
for failing to do. As After Virtue tells it, Kierkegaard perceived Kant’s 
failure to provide a basis for morals, panicked, and took up the search
for the next Holy Grail. Now, there are entries aplenty on Kant in the 
Papirer, and it is true that Kierkegaard recognized that Kant had not 
exacdy proven the esthetic life to be one of self-contradiction24. Never­
theless, there are no textual signs that this recognition ever prodded 
Kierkegaard into taking up the foundational project that MacIntyre 
charges him with bungling. Kierkegaard wrote and wrote about his 
writing and there is no hint of his aspiring to produce a basis for morals, 
and of this MacIntyre is well aware. Why then the decision to ignore 
Kierkegaard’s hyperconscious intentions? Does MacIntyre believe that 
while Kierkegaard thought he was writing about choice in fundamental 
connection with the formation of the self and the purification of the 
will, he was actually struggling to solve a problem that he was unaware 
of being driven by? Is there a latent appeal to the unconscious behind 
MacIntyre’s manifest historicizing? There has to be.
Do not get me wrong, I have no innate aversion to the idea that 
neither Kierkegaard nor MacIntyre necessarily knows what he is really 
up to; just the same, I see no reason for automatically dismissing an 
author’s long-held and continuously-stated intentions. MacIntyre has a 
lot of territory to cover and naturally travels in seven league boots, 
oblivious to the nitpickers. But is it nitpicking to complain that Mac­
Intyre has not shown Kierkegaard’s self-explanations to be inadequate? 
He has not justified his appeal to oblique purposes by showing us why 
he takes Kierkegaard to be in the dark about his projects. If I am any 
judge of the present age, someone is bound to reply that the story is the 
demonstration, but that is a rather unconvincing story. As some of 
Freud’s early case studies will attest, the richness of a narrative is no 
proof of the details of that narrative. Far from it, historical narratives, 
personal and otherwise, that roll smoothly and comprehensively along 
usually do so because they plow everything under. And for all his epi­
phanies, it must be said that MacIntyre has done his share of plowing. 
But now for one of the epiphanies.
5. The place of reason in the moral life
Though we may not have access to the justifications, Kierkegaard cer­
tainly held that there are universal moral truths. There is, however, 
another critical message in the botde of After Virtue, and I shall argue 
that this message sticks. As I read him, MacIntyre charges that Kierke­
gaard fails to acknowledge the role of reason in the moral life, and in a 
related blindspot, he fails to appreciate, let alone help us come to grips 
with, a fact that unsettles many a conscience and nearly every ethical 
theorist — the fact of moral diversity.
Kierkegaard’s greatest service may well have been to paint the 
ideal or at least one constellation of ideals from the inside out. A 
psychological realist in his own right, Kierkegaard teaches us to see with 
discernment just what the world looks like through ideals otherwise 
quite easily bandied about. I am no expert keeper of records on such 
topics, but on my judgment Kierkegaard ought to be reckoned either 
the first or the best moral phenomenologist, and yet for all of the ar­
resting detail of his portraits of perfectly fallen creatures striving to live 
in their thoughts of the right and the good, there is something missing. 
As MacIntyre observes, Kierkegaard pictures the earnest life as though 
there were nothing to it but what we moderns and post-moderns might 
call commitment. In his words and silences, Kierkegaard affirms that be­
hind every piece of moral confusion there is a will flapping in the breeze 
of whims. If you don’t rightly know what to do, then you don’t really 
will to do what is right.
That moral worth has as little to do with moral reasoning as it 
does with knowledge, is indirectly revealed in Kierkegaard’s jottings on 
the method of indirect communication. In his outlined but never de­
livered lectures on the ethico-religious dialectic of communication, 
Kierkegaard teaches that in the realm of the truly important there is 
much for a moral teacher to do, but nothing to teach; there is no object 
of communication, no knowledge to be conveyed. Kierkegaard’s think­
ing is clear and Kantian enough. Moral duties are universal. If, however, 
I was wanting in knowledge, then I wouldn’t be possessed of the duties 
that my sense of guilt assures me obtain. And Kierkegaard avows that if 
there is one thing I can trust it is my sense of guilt. Thus, while I may 
require a moral teacher to prevent me from eclipsing the knowledge to 
which my. duty and guilt witness, I don’t need anyone to put me in the 
know.
As every student of Kierkegaard comes quickly to understand, 
Kierkegaard believed the age to be suffering from an excess of mental 
activity; but in the excess of his struggles against such excesses, Kierke­
gaard could easily lead one to believe that every act of deliberation is an 
ethical evasion, that is, the will using reason to confuse and so excuse it­
self from what it now knows and is now trying to forget is its uncondi­
tional duty25. A grand master of suspicion, Kierkegaard was right to ob­
serve that reason often functions in the service of the pleasure/compla­
cency principle, but is the abuse of reason a good reason to sow blanket 
suspicions about reason? My reason says, „no“.
As I have complained, MacIntyre is mistaken to think that Kier­
kegaard does not offer reasons for choosing the ethical, but the justifi­
cation of particular ethical precepts is altogether another matter. To 
reiterate, MacIntyre argues that a principle has as much authority as we 
have reasons for abiding by that principle. As MacIntyre notes, Kierke­
gaard could not disagree more. An enemy of every form of meliorism, 
Kierkegaard is unambiguous, the ethical no less than the religious is 
„the unconditionally unconditional“. Just as unambiguously, Kierke­
gaard warns that while the unconditional has its reasons, the provision 
of those reasons relativizes it and thus subtracts rather than increases 
authority26. MacIntyre reports that Kierkegaard was the first to sever 
the connection between reason and authority (AV 42). Again, Kierke­
gaard couldn’t disagree more. According to his chronology of emerging 
ideas, it was only in the age of pure reason that people began to require 
explanations of their imperatives. Either way MacIntyre is on the mark, 
for Kierkegaard the force of our oughts in no way rests upon the 
answers to our whys. More than that, Kierkegaard would have judged 
the whole project of pressing for such reasons unethical. This is not 
hyperbole; listen to the terms in which Vigilius Haufniensis upbraids 
the individual who would dare to accuse good conscience of being un­
reasonable in its expectations: „The more ideal ethics is the better. It 
must not permit itself to be distracted by the babble that it is useless to 
require the impossible. For even to listen to such talk is unethical , . .“27 
— whether that talk be about being unable or about being unsure.
Kierkegaard all but takes it as a given that we ought to do what 
our father, worldly and other-worldly, commands us to do, and that is 
pretty much that. The ideal is obedience, and for all its other merits, 
obedience is not an ideal that is likely to prod consciousness-raising 
about either the interests of others or the consequences of our actions. 
But why should it? These are precisely the kinds of conditions that de­
votion to the unconditional has to be careful to blinker itself to. Though 
this is not to advise that one should ruminate until the moment to act 
has passed, it is irresponsible to cut the process of reflection short with 
the reflection that a choice must eventually be made, and besides, so 
long as you can imagine that you possess the best intentions, you cannot
go morally wrong. But what is more important, doing the right thing or 
having the right intention? For Kierkegaard, as much as for Schopen­
hauer28, it is the intention, the relative purity of heart29 that determines 
the moral worth of an action. The rest is external, which for Kierke­
gaard is to say, not of the utmost importance, i.e., „accidental“. Take 
this page from the Journal, a page which happens to find its way into the 
papers of Victor Eremita:
The main point is still that one should not be diverted by the 
external. When, in order to subvert the position that there is an 
absolute in morality, an appeal is made to variations in custom and 
use and such shocking examples as savages putting their parents to 
death, attention is centered merely upon the external. That is to 
say, if it could be proved that savages maintain that a person ought 
to hate his parents, it would be quite another matter; but this is 
not their thought; they believe that one should love them, and 
the error is only in the way of expressing it. For it is clear that the 
savages do not intend to harm their parents but to do good to 
them30.
Note the initial intimation — such questions are not raised in good faith, 
but rather in an attempt to subvert and so to excuse oneself from the 
unconditionality of absolutes. Slit your parent’s throats or sacrifice your 
life taking care of them, it is all essentially the same, so long as your in­
tentions are good. For the one who finally gave us the esthetic of morals 
that Kant lacked the Muse to write, the main thing is not to allow ex­
ternals -  i.e., the perceived consequences of our actions — to make us 
flinch. As though perceived consequences had nothing whatsoever to do 
with our intentions!
The inordinate emphasis that Kierkegaard lays on the how of our 
actions and our beliefs has its natural shadow in a delusory de-emphasis 
on the question of what precisely is to be done. This imbalance is no­
where more apparent than in the lack of urgency Kierkegaard shows 
with respect to questions of social justice. And yet, it hardly needs to be 
written that our virtuoso of inwardness did not decry all forms of reflec­
tion. While Kierkegaard did not trouble himself unduly about the moral 
worth of this action as opposed to that, his conscience was downright 
yeasty when it came to trying to decide whether or not it was God’s will 
that he do X or Y. Make no bones about it, he was quite concrete on
this score, or as Kant would have judged him — he was quite fantastic. 
For Kierkegaard, believing in a personal God entails the belief that God 
may at any time be personally involved in the events of this world. Thus, 
the true believer utters his intercessory and petitionary prayers; and thus, 
Kierkegaard rather quietly insists that the knight of faith is ever searching 
the palimpsestal text of daily events for directive „hints from God“ 31.
Kierkegaard was not much concerned with trying to hammer out 
the right secular „oughts“, and in MacIntyre’s terms, MacIntyre is essen­
tially correct — for Kierkegaard „there were no great problems of inter­
pretation“, or at least not beyond deciding whether or not he was an 
exception to duties otherwise accepted. But when it came to hammer­
ing out what it meant to believe in God, Kierkegaard’s reflections ren­
der it easy to see how Kierkegaard came to associate reflection with 
dizziness. For this essay’s final illustration, in a much abused teaching, Je­
sus tells us that the poor will always be with us32. He also commands us 
to be merciful. Yet how can a peasant with neither money nor power be 
merciful? Kierkegaard understood well that the impecunious have plenty 
to wrestle with, but he was in his own way generous enough to add this 
characteristically Kierkegaardian scruple. The poor ought to be merciful 
enough not to make the filthy rich feel filthy about their riches:
So the discourse turns to you, you wretched one, who can do 
nothing at all; do not forget to be merciful! Be merciful. This 
consolation, that you can be merciful, let alone that you are that, 
is far greater than if I could assure you that the most powerful 
person will show mercy to you. Be merciful to us more fortunate 
ones! Your care filled life is like a dangerous criticism of loving 
providence; you have it therefore in your power to make us an­
xious; therefore be merciful! In truth, how much mercifulness is 
shown toward the powerful and the fortunate by such an unfor­
tunate! Which, indeed, is more merciful -powerfully to alleviate 
another’s need or by suffering quietly and patiently to take care 
mercifully lest one disturb the joy and happiness of others?33
The answer worked out with both rigor and consistency is that the one 
fortunate in his misfortune is the more merciful, but I present this only 
as an instance of the kinds of interpretive problems that Kierkegaard re­
cognized and of the kind of reflection he would seem to recommend. 
For all the paragraphs he may have turned over in his mind and into his
diaries, there are precious few of the form: Is it right, for example, to do 
as Kierkegaard seems to have done, to lend money at interest?34 There 
are double, triple, and quadruple reflections upon his duties to God, but 
very little scrupling about his duties to his fellow human beings.
Unfortunately, MacIntyre pays no heed to Kierkegaard’s rather 
congenial critique of the tradition MacIntyre is trying to resuscitate, but 
as one distinctively Lutheran line of that critique repeats, the opposite of 
sin is not virtue, but faith35. Whether it be for the reasons Kierkegaard 
himself adduced, or for those woven into After Virtue, Kierkegaard had 
no faith that reason could compel us to compel ourselves to make the 
sacrifices that Kierkegaard understood to be the signature of the ethical. 
The conquest of self-love, to say nothing of the demon Kant could not 
discern, defiance, requires a much stricter taskmaster than we can bring 
to bear upon ourselves. For all his affinities with Kant, Kierkegaard 
marks this important difference:
Kant held that man was his own law (autonomy), i.e., bound 
himself under the law which he gave himself. In a deeper sense 
that means to say: lawlessness or experimentation. It is no harder 
than the thwacks which Sancho Panza applied to his own bottom. 
I can no more be really stricter in A than I am or than I wish 
myself to be in B. There must be some compulsion if it is to be a 
serious matter. If I am not bound by anything higher than myself, 
and if I am to bind myself, where am I to acquire the severity as 
A by which, as B, I am to be bound, so long as A and B are the 
same.36
One of Kierkegaard’s most astute interpreters, Louis Mackie, aptly puts 
the meaning of this journal entry in Kierkegaard’s own apothogem — 
„no man is stronger than himself*37. To put it in words that some claim 
have seen their day and their twilight, it is only by the love/fear of God 
that we are able to slip out of the snare of self-love and willfulness, and 
that — getting outside of oneself — is what distinguishes the ethico-reli- 
gious from the esthetic. On this decisive point, MacIntyre’s reading of 
Kierkegaard is true to the author that I know; for Kierkegaard early, 
middle and late, moral reasoning and ethical theorizing have as little to 
do with being moral as they do with the quest which Kierkegaard marks 
as singularly important -  the quest for a pure will.
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